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Abstract 
The design of environmental spending at the national or local level stands on the concept of 
subsidiarity and on the theory of fiscal federalism. The main question is, so forth, studying when 
centralization of a public economic function, such as the protection of the environment, is welfare 
improving. 
Using the stochastic frontier approach (SFA) on a panel of Italian regional data, this paper tries 
to test this issue, highlighting contrasting results. It seems in fact that, if Italy changes its 
administrative structure from a centralized to a decentralized government, and gives to local 
levels more autonomy in choosing how to spend public money, it is not certain if regional 
economic performance can improve. 
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1. Introduction 
The design of environmental spending at the national or local level stands on the concept of 
subsidiarity and on the theory of fiscal federalism. The main question is, so forth, studying when 
centralisation of public economic functions is welfare improving. The theoretical foundations 
could be identified in the seminal work of Musgrave (1959) in which he discusses the optimal level 
of centralisation of several public economic functions and in the works of Tiebout (1956) and 
Oates (1981).  
The basic economic theory of fiscal federalism explores the trade-off between the 
internalisation of external effects or economies of scale and their externalisation. The principal 
motive for decentralisation is to match the variety of preferences that exist in different 
jurisdictions. In contrast, centralisation may be warranted when the policy of a central 
government has consequences for another government that are not taken into account in its 
decision making process (cross-border externalities). In addition, the presence of fixed costs may 
make decentralised policies suboptimal. In that case centralisation benefits from economies of 
scale.  
More deeply the advantages and disadvantages of fiscal federalism are widely discussed in 
economics. While some authors argue that federalism favors individual initiatives and serves as a 
market preserving device, others emphasize the dangers arising from an increasing corruption and 
local capture due to decentralisation. 
In this work, we empirically study the contribution of environmental spending to the efficiency 
of central vs local units. This should be a contribution to the endless debate on the effective 
strengthening of the Italian fiscal federalism. In our opinion, the multi-faceted Italian case allows 
to disentangle the optimal design of fiscal federalism with a focus on the environmental spending. 
In Italy in fact the existence of different levels of government that coexist and sometimes overlap 
in their responsibilities, requires a careful design of the taxation structure. 
We model efficiency using the Stochastic Frontier Approach (Aigner et al., 1977; Meeusen and 
van den Broeck 1977). This approach allows to distinguish between production inputs and 
efficiency/inefficiency factors and to disentangle distances from the efficient frontier between 
those due to systematic components and those due to noise. The model used in our estimation is 
based on the Battese and Coelli (1995) specification.  
The samples used in this paper have been constructed using data that come from the Istat 
National Economic and Environmental Accounts. Our data almost cover the 1995 – 2007 period 
and refer to the Environmental Expenditures of Regions. 
The different impact of the environmental spending designed and applied at the national or 
local level on economic performance, measured by GDP per capita, is analyzed by additionally 
using controls for physical and human capital investment as well as further controls and indicators 
of fiscal federalism.  
Our empirical results, which still need to be checked for robustness, show how environmental 
fiscal rules binding on all levels, can help sustain environmental national commitment in countries 
having coalitions as in Italy. Coordinating institutions help in the use of moral suasion to 
encourage a coordinated response. 
In a decentralized fiscal system in which externalities exist at the local level and in which sub-
national governments have the power to provide local public services and to choose tax 
instruments, theory suggests that it is better to give the control of environmental tax to local 
governments.  
Using a parametric stochastic frontier analysis (SFA), we attempt to test these concepts. Our 
preliminary results do not confirm that the more a local government is responsible of its 
environmental policy the more is efficient in term of economic and social performance. 
 
 
2. Background Literature 
According to Tanzi (1995) the term “fiscal decentralization” refers to the devolution of the 
authority related to public finances and to the delivery of government services from the national 
to the sub-national levels of the government itself. Federal countries transfer resources from the 
central government to local jurisdictions in order to alleviate the imbalance between expenditures 
and revenues.  
The topic of fiscal federalism has been introduced into public finance theory during the second 
half of the twentieth century, opening the door to the systematic analysis of the theme. The main 
normative question associated with this subject concerns the extent to which fiscal powers and 
responsibilities should be transferred from higher to lower levels of government. 
This concept of federalism, that could have relevant economic consequences, has been studied 
in a lot of theoretical works and a number of attempts have been made to systematically 
understand its key economic principles (Bird, 2004; Boadway, 2003; Collins, 2001; McLure, 1998).  
Considering horizontal competition among various government units, one branch of the 
literature, that develops from Hayek (1939), argues that more information on the functioning of 
government is produced when more than one entity simultaneously try out various solutions. 
Another branch that goes back to Tiebout (1956), claims that competition by constituent 
governments for mobile citizens gives constituent governments incentives to provide their 
populations with a bundle of collective goods that reflects their preferences at a competitive price 
(Voigt and Blume, 2009).  
Looking at vertical competition instead, which means reasoning on the relationship between 
the federal and the state level, theoretical contributions mainly rely on Olson (1969) and Oates 
(1972) that find the main advantage of a federalist model in the capacity of a local government to 
satisfy a greater number of people’s preferences with respect to a central one. 
In order to lay down a clear path for the development that this research has followed, it is 
useful to recall the division among first and second generation theories of fiscal decentralization 
(Oates, 2005). As pointed out by Olson itself, the first generation group of theories was the basic 
theoretical structure of ﬁscal federalism as it emerged almost fifty years ago and founds on the 
works of Samuelson (1954, 1955) on the nature of public goods, Arrow (1970) on the 
conceptualization of the roles of the private and public sectors and Musgrave (1959) on public 
ﬁnance. These works together considered set a role for the government in correcting various 
forms of market failures. According to this perspective, considering a multi-level government 
setting, is it true the presumption that each level of government would seek to maximize the 
social welfare of its respective constituency.  
On the other side, second generation theories starts from strands of literature which are 
outside the ﬁeld of public economics such as principal-agent problems, the economics of 
information, the new theory of the ﬁrm, organization theory, and the theory of contracts (Qian 
and Weingast, 1997). 
A policy of fiscal decentralization is directed towards the transfer of fiscal powers and 
responsibilities from the national to sub-national governments . While fiscal centralization is often 
a response to the demands of national unity, fiscal decentralization may be seen as a response to 
the demands for diversity and accountability within the community. On balance, the first 
generation theorists investigating fiscal federalism tended to associate the process of fiscal 
decentralization with an enhancement in the overall degree of public sector responsiveness to a 
public demand and, ultimately, to an improvement in the economic efficiency of public economic 
activities by better linking resource allocation with public preferences. 
As already said, among many different economic ideas about decentralization of public 
functions and the associated issue of public finances under decentralized systems, seminal 
contributions were made by Tiebout (1956), Musgrave (1959) and Oates (1972), all of whom laid 
the strong foundation for significant discussions of fiscal decentralization. Olson (1969), through 
his concept of fiscal equivalence, also made an important contribution. These studies, in 
conjunction with the public choice approach to multi-tier government initially developed by 
Brennan and Buchanan (1980) represent seminal works in the first generation literature on fiscal 
decentralization. 
In broad terms, it may be concluded that there are two general streams of first generation 
theory, with Tiebout having a major influence on both. There are (i) studies that draw on Tiebout’s 
impure local public goods concept and integrate it with the Musgravian framework and (ii) studies 
that draw on Tiebout’s notion of inter-jurisdictional mobility and link it with forces that limit the 
size of the public sector. The work of Oates, for example, would fall under the first category, 
referred to here as the ‘core’ first generation theory of fiscal decentralization, while the public 
choice approach of Brennan and Buchanan would fall under the second, non-core, category. 
Importantly, though, the non-core public choice approach is a ‘complement’ to ‘core’ first 
generation theory, as it relates to the particular question of fiscal decentralization. 
Moving towards the second generations theories we must consider two main concepts that 
underlie their development. The first concerns the political processes and the behavior of political 
agents in which participants may have their own objective functions. Government officials may 
not need to seek the common good as assumed in the first generation theory; rather, they may 
not act to maximize the welfare of their constituencies. This consideration has obvious links to 
public choice theory – which was the main ‘non-core’ stream of the first generation theory of fiscal 
decentralization. The second concerns the issue of asymmetric information and political agents. 
Some particular participants have more knowledge of local preferences and tastes and cost 
structure compared to the others. To analyse these influences, fiscal federalism is examined from 
the perspective of a framework on industrial organization and microeconomic theory. Much of 
these works by the second generation theorists concerns the issue of balance between the degree 
of fiscal centralization and fiscal decentralization. While the general support for fiscal 
decentralization in the first generation theory is acknowledged, the dangers of going too far in the 
fiscally decentralized system are a feature of the second generation theory. 
The emerging second generation theory has been characterized in terms of two motivating 
issues: incentives and knowledge (Vo, 2008). Both motivations have contributed to an increased 
economic efficiency: incentives are required for sub national governments to do a better job to 
avoid outward migration of people and firms; and knowledge of local preferences and tastes is 
crucial to achieve economic efficiency when local public goods and services are provided by sub 
national governments. The contributions of the second generation theory are mainly drawn from 
the economics of transaction cost, incomplete contracts and principal–agent perspectives (Vo, 
2008). Leading studies, that have been classed as parts in the emerging second generation theory, 
are associated with Weingast (1995), Seabright (1996), Lockwood (2002) and Besley and Coate 
(2003). 
 
 
3. The Italian Federalism 
Looking at Italy from a multi level government perspective, the country could be defined as a 
regional system moving towards a federal one. There exist in fact four levels of sub national 
government: Regions, Provinces, Municipalities and Metropolitan Cities, with these last three 
entities forming the “local government”1. 
This structure dates back to 150 years ago, at the time of Italy’s Unity and it has been modeled 
on the French one. For a long time however, the central government enjoyed all the power and 
decided over most of the resources.  
Starting from the end of the 20th century this tendency has been inverted, thanks to some 
important reforms of the Italian legal system (see box 3.1 for a brief description of the main 
interventions).  
Among them, the main one is the Constitutional Law n. 3 of 2001 which amended the Title V of 
the Italian Constitution (articles 114, 117 and 119)2. In that occasion the legislator introduced deep 
changes to the relations between state, regions and local authorities with regard to legislative and 
administrative competencies, in order to increase the functions that fall under the jurisdiction of 
                                                     
1 Brosio, G. (2010) - Economia Pubblica Moderna. Ed.  Giappichelli. 
2 The Constitution is the Supreme Law of the Italian legislation.  It sets forth the framework for national and sub-national relationships. All other 
laws must not contradict the Constitution. 
the autonomous entities. It is worth noting in fact, that the “new” article 114 poses the state, the 
regions, the metropolitan cities, the provinces and the municipalities at the same level, 
substantially reversing the old approach that saw the state above everything (Frosini, 2009). 
Although a huge number of laws and regulations have been designed and mostly enacted, the 
process is still lagging behind. The main problem is that, in order to be really autonomous, local 
entities need to have their own financial resources. The funding instead, has remained almost 
completely in the hands of the central government. This picture becomes clearer considering that 
even if, according to the law, public spending is equally divided among the central government 
and the local authorities, the latter raise less than 18% of tax revenues (Frosini, 2009).  
 
Box 3.1: Main laws which are intended to transform Italy in a federal state. 
 Law n. 142/1990 (June 8th ): “code of local autonomies” 
 Law n. 81/1993 (March 25th ): “direct election of major, president of the province, municipality council and 
provincial council”. The subsequent Law n.120/1999 extends the mandate of mayor to five years and reviews 
the electoral system. 
 Law n. 59/1997 (March 15th ): “delegation to the government to transfer functions and tasks to regions and 
local authorities for the reform of the Public Administration and for the Administrative simplification (the so 
called Bassanini 1). 
 Law n.127/1997 (May 15th): “urgent measures for simplification of administrative” (the so called Bassanini 2) 
 The Bassanini 1 and 2 were further amended by Laws  n. 191/1998 and n. 50/1999 (Bassanini ter and quater).  
 Constitutional Law n. 1/1999: “provisions concerning the direct election of the regional government and 
president and the statutory autonomy of Regions”. 
 Constitutional Law n. 3/2001: “changes to Title V of Part II of the Constitution”. In particular art. 119 of the Law 
modifies financing rules of Regions, Provinces, Municipalities and Metropolitan Cities by reinforcing the 
principle of the local financial authonomy and introducing the criteria of fiscal capacity in the management of 
government equalization transfers. 
 Law n. 131/2003 (June 5th ): “provision for the adjustment of the Republic order to the Constitutional Law n. 
3/2001 “ 
 Constitutional Law n. /2005 (November 18
th
): additional changes to Title V of Constitution towards an explicitly 
federal model, however, in June 2006 rejected by referendum of confirmation. 
 Law n. 42/2009 (May 5th ): delegation to the Government on the matter of fiscal federalism, in accordance with 
article 119 of the Constitution. 
 
To this end, the financial autonomy of Regions and Local Authorities is guaranteed and 
regulated by art. 119 of the Constitution which has started to be implemented effectively by the 
Law n. 42/2009. The most innovative and important principle contained in this delegation is the 
introduction of the so called “standard cost” criterion in place of the “historical expense” criteria 
used so far to determine the costs necessary to the pursuit of the functions entrusted to the 
territorial bodies (Scuto, 2010)3. 
 
3.1 A brief quantitative description of Italian Federalism 
From a quantitative point of view, the Italian public sector is still quietly centralized. Almost a 
half of the public spending comes in fact from the state. 
Table 3.1 briefly describes the allocation of competencies and resources as it is now. 
 
Table 3.1: Competencies and financing of Italian different levels of government (2011). 
Entity Competencies Financing 
Regions Legislative and administrative powers on 
issues such as Social Services (health, 
education, culture), Planning and Use of 
natural resources (environmental 
protection, transportations, forestry etc.)  
and Economics (tourism, agriculture, 
trade, etc.) 
Own taxes (IRAP, fuel excise duty, 
IRPEF, road taxes) and grants from 
the central government. 
Provinces Administrative powers on employment, 
road maintenance, environmental 
protection. 
Own taxes and grants from both the 
central government and the regions  
(almost equally divided). 
Municipalities Administrative powers on almost all 
aspects of the quality of life of citizens 
(culture, traffic, water, cemeteries, public 
gardens, manufacturing, etc) 
Own taxes (ICI, IRPEF, TARSU, rates 
on services) and grants from the 
central government. 
  
Table 3.2 highlights the evolution of the expenses of regions, provinces and municipalities in 
absolute values and per capita.  
                                                     
3 For a critical treating of the Law n. 42/2003 see for example Scuto, F. (2010). 
  
 
4. The Empirical Model 
The neoclassical paradigm in economics assumes that production is always efficient. However, 
it is quite unrealistic that two regions – even if identical – can produce a similar output with the 
same costs and profits. In other words, the difference between two regions can be explained 
through the analysis of efficiency and some unforeseen exogenous shocks, as described by Desli et 
al. (2002). 
A simple OLS regression is not sufficient to estimate the relationship between output and 
inputs as described in Feld et al. (2004). In fact it has several limits, such as it does not discriminate 
between rent extraction and productive efficiency and does not simultaneously take into account 
distances from the efficiency frontier for a given production function.  
Region Pop
total per capita total per capita total per capita 1000/p
Piemonte 3.738 849 905 206 10.281 2.336 4.401
Valle d'Aosta 198 1.572 0 0 1.063 8.435 126
Lombardia 8.105 841 1.308 136 23.155 2.401 9.642
Trentino Alto Adige 1.242 1.233 0 0 258 256 1.007
Bolzano 604 1.222 0 0 3.237 6.554 494
Trento 638 1.243 0 0 2.616 5.096 513
Veneto 3.536 732 617 128 9.950 2.059 4.832
Friuli Venezia Giulia 1.333 1.091 289 237 4.673 3.824 1.222
Liguria 1.768 1.099 310 192 4.280 2.658 1.610
Emilia -Romagna 3.841 898 668 156 9.823 2.297 4.276
Toscana 3.315 902 781 212 8.301 2.257 3.677
Umbria 755 853 202 229 1.919 2.170 884
Marche 1.276 822 324 209 3.237 2.084 1.553
Lazio 4.435 797 711 128 19.439 3.496 5.561
Abruzzo 974 736 190 144 3.104 2.345 1.324
Molise 276 861 51 158 1.102 3.433 321
Campania 4.795 825 791 136 12.606 2.169 5.811
Puglia 2.741 672 509 125 8.229 2.019 4.077
Basilicata 447 756 167 282 1.304 2.206 591
Calabria 1.489 742 415 207 4.382 2.182 2.008
Sicilia 4.469 889 597 119 17.780 3.535 5.030
Sardegna 38 23 265 159 5.414 3.251 1.666
Italy 50.455 846 9.099 153 156.151 2.619 59.619
Municipality exp. Province exp. Regional exp.
Source: ISTAT I bilanci consuntivi delle Regioni e delle Province autonome 2007-2008, edition 2010 and ISTAT I bilanci
consuntivi delle Province e dei Comuni 2008, edition 2010. Current expenditures, budget commitments
Table 3.2: Current expenditure of Municipalities, Provinces and Regions - year 2008
(absolute values, millions €) 
To test whether local environmental spending and standards inputs affect productive efficiency 
at the region level, we have estimated regional production functions using the stochastic frontier 
approach (SFA)4. This methodology was developed independently by Aigner et al., (1977) and 
Meeusen and van den Broeck (1977). This approach allows to distinguish between production 
inputs and efficiency/inefficiency factors and to disentangle distances from the efficient frontier 
between those due to systematic components and those due to noise. This parametric approach is 
preferred to nonparametric ones since it avoids that outliers are considered as very efficient 
countries (Signorini, 2000). 
The main idea is that the SFA, which represents the maximum output level for a given input set, 
is assumed to be stochastic in order to capture exogenous shocks beyond the control of regions. 
Since all regions are not able to produce the same frontier output, an additional error term is 
introduced to represent technical inefficiency that, in turn, is in the control of regions5. After these 
early studies, the SFA methodology has been extended in many directions using both cross-
sectional and panel data. The availability of panel data allows to study the behaviour of technical 
inefficiency over time. Among others, Pitt and Lee (1981), Schmidt and Sickles (1984) Kumbhakar 
(1987) and Battese et al. (1989) treated technical inefficiency as time invariant while for example 
Cornwell et al., (1990), Kumbhakar (1990), Battese and Coelli (1992) and Lee and Schmidt (1993) 
allowed technical inefficiency to vary over time even if they modelled efficiency as a systematic 
function of time. 
The search for the determinants of efficiency changes has been firstly pursued by adopting a 
two stage approach in which the efficiencies estimated in the first stage were then regressed 
against a vector of explanatory variables. Further development of this technique led to the 
adoption of a single stage approach in which explanatory variables are incorporated directly into 
the inefficiency error component6. In particular, Kumbhakar, Gosh and McGuckin (1991) noted the 
inconsistency between the i.i.d. assumption on the inefficiency effects at the first stage and the 
non identical distribution of the predicted inefficiency effects in the second stage, and proposed a 
                                                     
4
 A number of comprehensive reviews of this literature is now available. See for example Forsund et al. (1980), 
Schmidt (1986), Bauer (1990), Greene (1993) and Coelli et al. (1998). 
5
 We follow the Farrel, M.J. (1957) measure of firm’s efficiency consisting in two components: technical and allocative. 
The former reflects the ability of a firm to obtain maximal output from a given set of inputs while the latter reflects 
the ability of a firm to use the inputs in optimal proportions given their respective prices. These considerations are 
obviously true also at the country level considering that the aggregate output comes from the sum of national 
producers. 
6
 For a review see Kumbhakar and Knox - Lovell (2000).  
model in which the inefficiency effects were explicit functions of a vector of firm-specific factors 
and the parameters were estimated in a single stage maximum likelihood procedure. 
A further development of this first approach has been the Battese and Coelli (1995) model in 
which the allocative efficiency is imposed, the first-order profit maximising conditions removed, 
and panel data is permitted. Thus, the Battese and Coelli (1995) model specification may be 
expressed as: 
 
(1) Yit = xit + (vit - uit)                              i=1,...,N, t=1,...,T 
 
where Yit is (the logarithm of) the production of the i-th region in the t-th time period; xit is a 
k1 vector of (transformations of the) input quantities of the i-th region in the t-th time period;  
is an vector of unknown parameters. The unobserved random noise is divided into a first 
component vit which are random variables following the assumption of normally distributed error 
terms [iid N(0, V
2)], and a second independent component defined as uit which are non-negative 
random variables. These variables are assumed to capture the effects of technical inefficiency in 
production and are assumed to be independently distributed as truncations at zero of the N(mit, 
U
2) distribution. 
The mean of this truncated normal distribution is a function of systematic variables that can 
influence the efficiency of a region: 
 
(2) mit = zit + εit, 
where zit is a p1 vector of variables which may have an effect on the production function of a 
region; and  is an 1p vector of parameters to be estimated. 
Following Battese and Corra (1977), the simultaneous maximum likelihood estimation of the 
two equation system is expressed in terms of the variance parameters 2=2v+
2
u and 
=2u/(
2
v+
2
u), to provide asymptotically efficient estimates
7. Hence, it is clear that the test on 
the significance of the parameter  is a test on the significance of the stochastic frontier 
specification (the acceptance of the null hypothesis that the true value of the parameter equals 
zero implies that 2u, the non random component of the production function residual, is zero).  
The technical efficiency of the i-th region in the t-th time period is given by: 
 
                                                     
7
 The log-likelihood function and the derivatives are presented in the appendix of Battese and Coelli (1993). 
(3) 
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5. Our Empirical Model 
In this paper we analyze the economic performance of Italian regions. Following the 1995 
Battese and Coelli specification, we estimate a production function of Italy based on regional data. 
Model results are computed using the program FRONTIER 4.1, which can manage either 
balanced and unbalanced panel data. This paper is an empirical application of the neoclassical 
growth model using a different empirical approach with respect to the main work of Mankiw, 
Romer and Weil (1992). 
We perform our estimations using a panel data of 20 Italian regions across 13 years. In our 
model, the production of each region is measured by gross domestic product Yit and, as usual is 
assumed to be a function of three inputs: physical capital (Kit), labour (Lit) and human capital (Hit). 
We divide capital in two types because we want to catch the importance of local authorities in the 
human capital formation, even if the central government is still responsible for the high level 
education expenses in Italy. 
By assuming that the production function takes the log - linear Cobb-Douglas form, our 
stochastic frontier production model can be specified as follows:  
 
(4) 
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where the dependent variable is the value of the economic performance of the i-th region at 
time t (i=1,...,N; t=1,...,T), divided by a scale variable (the labour force) in order to remove 
potential problems of heteroskedasticity, multicollinearity and output measurement (Hay-Liu, 
1997) and the independent variables are: i) physical capital pro-capite (K/L) which is the regional 
capital stock per worker of the i-th region at time t and ii) human capital (H/L) which is the 
regional education spending per worker of the i-th region at time t. Moreover, to take into 
account the differences among Italian regions and the impact of local culture and geography on 
the local economic performance, we have added the interaction of physical and human capital 
with m-1 dummies accounting for the four different geographical areas in which Italy can be 
divided according to economical and cultural characteristics (for more details see Appendix A).  
To take into account the technical inefficiencies of Italian regions, we model the second 
component of the error as a function of several observable explanatory variables as we show in 
the following equation:  
 
(5) it
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where DESit  is the decentralization of environmental spending, POPit represents the size of 
each region, MFit  is the fragmentation of the municipalities within a region and PFit is the 
fragmentation of provinces within a region. Finally to capture the region localization we consider 
the m-1 geographical dummies. 
As we have already underlined, the focus of our analysis is the impact of local environmental 
spending on local economic performance to somehow try to measure the efficiency of an 
environmental federalism in Italy. Following Feld et al. (2004), we consider only two of five 
variables that the authors analyze for their test of the Swiss federalism. The decentralization of the 
environmental spending is measured by the ratio of local environmental spending on the total 
regional spending.  
Following the traditional Tiebout approach, decentralization is hypothesized to have a positive 
effect on local economic performance. However, this variable is not sufficient to explain the 
autonomy of a local government especially in Italy where the federalism is not yet completely 
implemented, as it has been sketched in paragraph 3. For this reason, our estimations explicitly 
take into account some fragmentation variables. In particular, municipal fragmentation has been 
constructed by dividing the number of towns existing in each region by the regional population; 
provincial fragmentation is instead the ratio between the number of provinces and the regional 
population.  
The possibility of exploiting economies of scale in the reform of fiscal federalism is analyzed by 
these two variables. In the theoretical debate in fact, it is argued that the number of jurisdictions 
should be reduced by mergers, in order to exploit economies of scale. Thus, if there are economies 
of scale, the lack of their exploitation, i.e. a higher number of communities, should have a negative 
impact on economic performance. 
Finally, in order to analyze a recent issue emerged in the New Economic Geography literature, 
which is that a region belonging to a well developed area can perform better than a region 
belonging to a less developed area, we have introduced the macro-areas dummies interacted with 
input factors. A region in the north of Italy in fact should influence positively the regional 
economic performance and thus the technical inefficiency should be less with respect to others; in 
other words, the gap from the stochastic frontier of this region should be not so big. 
 
 
6. Data and Results 
 
The sample used in this paper has been selected by drawing data from ISTAT National Economic 
Accounting, Regional Economic Accounts and Environmental Economic Accounts. Data are 
collected yearly from 1995 to 2007 for the twenty Italian regions.  
The empirical analysis has been performed using a balanced panel data of 260 observations. 
Table 6.1 reports descriptive statistics of per-capita output, per-capita physical capital, per-capita 
human capital and other variables relevant in our model for the overall panel and for subsets of 
regions divided considering the belonging to the different macro-areas. Since Italy is not a perfect 
federal country, the local environmental expenditure variable is calculated by the National 
Institute of Statistics, as we described in more details in Appendix B.  
In particular, both the North-West area and the North-East area represent the richest and well 
developed part of Italy. In fact, focusing on the average product of labor which, generally speaking 
could be considered as labour productivity, the data show that in mean the regions of the Centre-
North of Italy are more productive than the regions of the South of Italy. However, this dualism is 
not confirmed by the “decentralization of environmental spending” variable, because all Italian 
regions spend more or less the same percentage of their budget in environment issues with 
respect to total public expenditures. 
 
  
Table 6.2 reports the results of the stochastic frontiers estimations. The efficient frontier has 
been estimated using the 1995 Battese and Coelli specification. Since, in all specifications, we 
reject the null hypothesis of the insignificance of the non random component of the production 
function residual, we can conclude that the stochastic frontier specification is a good model to 
analyze the effect of local environmental spending on the regional economic performance. 
In particular, from the first to the fifth column, we report the results of estimations which 
include step by step the different variables of fiscal federalism relevant for the environment. In all 
columns, the results indicate that production function performs relatively well. As usual in this 
estimations the input factors coefficients show a positive sign. However, the coefficients of the 
per-capita physical capital become significant only if we introduce in the technical inefficiency 
Table 6.1: Descriptive Statistics 
  Y_L K_L H_L 
Decentralization 
of environmental 
spending 
Population 
Municipality 
fragmentation 
Province 
fragmentation 
IT
A
LY
 
mean 51.79 11.18 2.52 1.15 2,872,458 0.197 0.0028 
p50 51.70 10.83 2.36 1.17 1,828,748 0.165 0.0024 
sd 6.69 1.86 0.70 0.48 2,275,104 0.135 0.0018 
min 38.78 7.19 1.55 0.19 116,653 0.063 0.0009 
max 66.49 17.84 4.13 2.46 9,545,441 0.634 0.0086 
N 260 260 260 260 260 260 260 
N
O
R
TH
-W
ES
T 
mean 57.68 11.71 2.05 1.40 3,770,553 0.304 0.003 
p50 56.22 11.95 1.85 1.19 2,927,227 0.225 0.002 
sd 3.55 1.74 0.50 0.74 3,451,777 0.189 0.002 
min 51.23 8.09 1.64 0.19 116,653 0.143 0.001 
max 62.72 15.70 3.58 2.46 9,545,441 0.63 0.008 
N 52 52 52 52 52 52 52 
N
O
R
TH
-E
A
ST
 mean 56.65 13.01 1.93 1.01 2,671,094 0.188 0.002 
p50 56.77 12.56 1.79 0.97 2,553,808 0.156 0.002 
sd 2.09 2.13 0.39 0.24 1,637,832 0.103 0.0006 
min 51.76 10.27 1.55 0.48 902,177 0.082 0.001 
max 60.31 17.84 3.38 1.41 4,773,554 0.369 0.003 
N 52 52 52 52 52 52 52 
C
EN
TR
E 
mean 54.75 10.62 2.26 1.14 2,757,716 0.107 0.002 
p50 52.10 10.62 2.19 1.24 2,513,332 0.093 0.003 
sd 6.21 0.89 0.23 0.28 1,740,286 0.353 0.0009 
min 47.64 8.80 1.92 0.49 813,664 0.069 0.0009 
max 66.49 12.20 2.89 1.64 5,493,308 0.167 0.003 
N 52 52 52 52 52 52 52 
SO
U
TH
 
mean 44.94 10.27 3.18 1.10 2,581,464 0.193 0.003 
p50 45.06 10.16 3.31 1.22 1,828,748 0.21 0.003 
sd 1.99 1.31 0.49 0.44 1,941,246 0.11 0.002 
min 38.78 7.19 2.33 0.23 320,074 0.063 0.0009 
max 48.33 13.07 4.13 1.84 5,790,929 0.425 0.0062 
N 104 104 104 104 104 104 104 
Note: Y is GDP in millions at constant 2000 euro; L is labour force in thousand; K is gross fixed capital formation in 
millions at constant 2000 euro; Decentralization of environmental spending is expressed in percentage and 
Municipality fragmentation and Province fragmentation are expressed per 1000 inhabitant. 
function the main important variables of federalism such as decentralization of environmental 
spending and fragmentation. 
The decentralization shows a positive sign and is very significant especially in the last three 
columns. This implies that the federalism of the environmental expenditure is not efficient 
because it increases the specific error component and thus the inefficiency of regions, reducing 
the regional economic performance. Instead when we introduce municipal and provincial 
fragmentation separately, the results confirm a negative sign and thus this can have a positive 
effect on regional efficiency and regional economic performance. These fragmentation variables 
establish that there are not economies of scales to exploit. So it seems that there is not a high 
number of municipalities and provinces. 
Finally, the localization of Italian regions is relevant, as expected, with respect to labour 
productivity. In particular, regions belonging to the South area have positive and significant effects 
on economic efficiency. Instead as regards the North-west and North-east the result is puzzling. It 
seems that there is a negative impact on economic performance even if the significance is very 
low. 
 
 Table 6.2: Inefficiency models with GDP pro-capite as dependent variable 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Const            β0 3.52 3.52 3.28 3.28 3.11 
t-ratio 62.22 62.58 51.63 51.63 50.95 
K/L               β1 0.03 0.03 0.35 0.35 0.33 
t-ratio 0.76 0.68 4.64 4.64 8.39 
H/L               β2 0.02 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.08 
t-ratio 1.04 2.49 2.98 2.98 4.26 
K/L*North West   β3 0.23 0.23 0.01 0.01 0.07 
t-ratio 7.08 6.25 0.11 0.11 2.14 
K/L*North East   β4 0.18 0.18 -0.05 -0.05 0.02 
t-ratio 5.63 4.97 -0.63 -0.63 0.79 
K/L*South   β5 0.10 0.09 -0.14 -0.14 -0.07 
t-ratio 3.06 2.29 -1.81 -1.81 -2.22 
H/L*North West   β6 -0.08 -0.11 0.37 0.37 0.30 
t-ratio -2.53 -3.25 6.91 6.91 5.99 
H/L*North East   β7 -0.04 -0.07 -0.01 -0.01 0.01 
t-ratio -1.27 -2.18 -0.13 -0.13 0.20 
H/L*South   β8 0.63 0.61 0.35 0.35 0.29 
t-ratio 6.86 5.90 5.01 5.01 3.69 
const       γ0 0.12 0.12 1.45 1.45 1.55 
t-ratio 1.68 1.37 8.07 8.07 11.62 
Decentralization of 
environmental spending      γ1 
-0.22 0.35 0.50 0.50 0.52 
t-ratio -4.86 2.70 6.73 6.73 7.58 
Popolation γ2 
 
-0.66 -1.04 -1.04 -0.84 
t-ratio 
 
-3.89 -5.65 -5.65 -9.15 
Municipality fragmentation   γ3 
  
-0.07 
 
-0.09 
t-ratio 
  
-12.82 
 
-12.19 
Province fragmentation   γ4 
   
-0.07 0.0001 
t-ratio 
   
-12.82 3.72 
North West   γ5 0.01 0.003 -0.01 -0.01 0.01 
t-ratio 0.48 0.20 -1.43 -1.43 1.32 
North East   γ6 -0.13 -0.13 -0.05 -0.05 0.05 
t-ratio -3.60 -3.87 -0.28 -0.28 1.00 
South   γ7 -0.85 -0.84 -0.42 -0.42 -0.18 
t-ratio -2.49 -2.40 -2.43 -2.43 -7.01 
Observations 260 260 260 260 260 
sigma squared 0.01 0.01 0.002 0.002 0.001 
t-ratio 5.42 5.88 7.68 7.68 8.81 
gamma 0.95 0.94 0.51 0.51 0.27 
t-ratio 59.37 69.87 3.40 3.40 2.25 
Log likelihood 445.92 449.90 504.27 504.27 511.95 
Note: K/L is the log of gross fixed capital formation/total labour force; H/L is the log of local education spending/ total 
labour force; North-West, North-East and South are the Macroarea dummies as described in Appendix A; 
Decentralization of environmental spending is log of local environmental spending/local total public expenditure and 
Municipality fragmentation and Province fragmentation are the ration between the number of regional Municipalties 
or Province and regional population. 
In order to deepen this analysis, we have estimated technical inefficiencies of each region, 
using the model described in column (5) on Table 6.2. In Table 6.3 we report the technical 
inefficiencies in three different years: 1995, 2000 and 2007. Then, we rank Italian regions 
according to the level of inefficiency reached in 2007. 
The results show that Valle d’Aosta, Piemonte and Liguria, all three belonging to the North-
West area, are placed more or less at the top of the classification in all years considered, 
representing the most inefficient regions with respect to the federalist issue. In other words these 
three regions are the less close to the stochastic frontier. Instead, the last three regions (Puglia, 
Sardegna and Abruzzo) are the more close to the stochastic frontier, and thus they seems to be 
the more efficient regions of Italy. 
 
 
7. Concluding Remarks 
The results of our estimations confirm that the regions located in Southern Italy are the most 
efficient. This efficiency is mainly due to the fragmentation of municipalities and provinces, while 
the decentralization of local environmental spending reduces the efficiency of a region. This 
Table6.3: Italian regions ranking of technical inefficiency based on 2007 and compared with previous years 
Regions 1995 2000 2007 
Valle d'Aosta 1 1 1 
Piemonte 3 2 2 
Liguria 4 3 3 
Umbria 2 4 4 
Marche 5 5 5 
Lombardia 6 6 6 
Toscana 7 7 7 
Lazio 8 8 8 
Trentino Alto Adige 10 9 9 
Friuli Venezia Giulia 12 11 10 
Basilicata 9 10 11 
Calabria 11 12 12 
Molise 13 13 13 
Veneto 17 16 14 
Campania 15 15 15 
Emilia Romagna 18 17 16 
Sicilia 14 14 17 
Puglia 19 19 18 
Sardegna 16 18 19 
Abruzzo 20 20 20 
 
results are dampening the hope for gaining efficiency from the changeover from the centralization 
to the federalism system. In other words, if Italy changes its administrative structure from a 
centralized to a decentralized government and gives to local levels more autonomy in choosing 
how to spend public money, it is not certain if regional economic performances can improve. 
Moreover, the more advanced regions in terms of productions seems to be the less efficient in 
terms of federalism. 
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Appendix A 
The definition of the 4 macro-areas of Italy: 
MACRO-AREAS ITALIAN REGIONS 
NORTH - WEST 
Piemonte 
Valle d'Aosta/Vallée d'Aoste 
Lombardia 
Liguria 
NORTH - EAST 
Trentino-Alto Adige/Südtirol 
Veneto 
Friuli-Venezia Giulia 
Emilia-Romagna 
CENTRE 
Toscana 
Umbria 
Marche 
Lazio 
SOUTH 
Abruzzo 
Molise 
Campania 
Puglia 
Basilicata 
Calabria 
Sicilia 
Sardegna 
 
Variables used in the estimations 
Source ISTAT - National Economic Accounts - Regional Accounts - Environmental Accounts: 
 Output (Y): GDP millions of euros, chain-linked volumes with reference to year 2000  
 Physical Capital (K): Gross Fixed Capital, millions of euros, chain-linked volumes with reference to 
year 2000 
 Labour (L): Total Labour Force (thousands of employed) 
 Human Capital (H): Educational spending by public administration at the regional level, millions 
of euros, chain-linked volumes with reference to year 2000 
 Physical Capital per capita (K/L): Capital stock per worker  
 Physical Capital per capita (H/L): Educational spending per worker  
 Decentralization of environmental spending (DES): Environmental protection spending by public 
administration at the regional level, millions of euros, chain-linked volumes with reference to 
year 2000. 
 Size of a Region (POP): Population within a Region 
 Fragmentation of municipalities (MF): number of Municipalities within a Region 
 Fragmentation of provinces (PF): number of Provinces within a Region 
 Geographical dummies: Macro-areas of Italy as described in the previous table of this appendix  
Appendix B 
Methodological note regarding the official statistics and the calculus of the Environmental 
Protection Expenditure of Regions. 
In the debate on sustainable development, one of the main topics is the amount of costs that 
the economic system has to do in order to protect the environment. To answer the growing 
demand for statistical information to support sustainable development policies, over the past 
fifteen years the official statisticians have been involved in the definition of integrated systems for 
the analysis of data and indicators related to economic, social and environmental phenomena. 
In this framework, the event of environmental protection spending, with all the breakdowns 
usually considered necessary (by institutional sector, by sector of economic activity, by sector of 
environmental intervention, etc..), is generally interpreted as an indicator of the "response" of the 
socio-economic system to environmental problems, referring to the terminology derived from the 
DPSIR scheme (Driving Forces - Pressures - State - Impacts - Responses) which is one of the 
conceptual models most used at the international level to represent the system of relations 
between anthropogenic and natural environment. 
Environmental protection spending particularly supported by the public sector has a 
strategic interest because it constitutes a crucial element for the analysis and understanding of 
complex realities. Information about the role and relative weight of public spending 
compared to that of other subjects of the economy is used to assess the positioning of 
environmental policies compared to reference models such as the "polluter pays" principle. The 
growing of the environmental expenditure supported by the government indicates in many cases a 
situation in which government intervention in the environment tends to replace that of 
polluters and thus is often indicative of a reality in which this principle 
does not seem to find enough application. Considering more general analysis of 
public policy, it is important to identify the financial effort for the protection of the environment 
relative to that supported by other policies. The information on environmental expenditure in an 
economic system, and in particular on public sector spending, is the subject of one of the  
environmental accounts produced within environmental accounting systems developed by 
Statistics Institutes of international organizations and member states and is part of other statistical 
information systems including the European System of National Economic Accounts. 
Given the purpose of our work, we provide some details on Environmental Protection 
Expenditure of Italian Regions drawn by National Economic Accounts and in particular by 
Environmental Economic Accounts.  
The time series available have been calculated by ISTAT starting from final balances of Regional 
administrations reclassified according to the classifications, definitions and schemes of the System 
of Satellite Account of Environmental Protection Expenditure EPEA (Environmental Protection 
Expenditure Account) part of the large system SERIEE  (Système Européen de Rassemblement de 
l’Information Economique sur l’Environnement) as developed by Eurostat since 2002.  
The financial outlays exposed in the Regional balances are reviewed through an ad hoc process 
of analysis named “budget analysis methodology” aimed at identifying and quantifying those 
expenses finalized to protect the environment, as defined by Eurostat references. This 
methodology of quantification of public expenditure of environmental  protection has been jointly 
developed by Istat and Italian Ministry of Environment (ISTAT, 2006). The accounts illustrate in 
more details the Environmental Expenditure of the Regions by environmental sector of 
intervention and by type of expenditure (current expenditure and capital expenditure). They 
describe the financial resources used in operations or activities to protect the environment from: i) 
pollution (air emissions, water discharges, waste, soil pollution, etc..); and ii) degradation (loss of 
biodiversity, soil erosion, salinization, etc.). Moreover, they describe the costs incurred to use and 
manage natural resources in a sustainable way (waterways, energy resources, forest resources, 
wildlife and flora and so on). These expenditures include instrumental activities such as monitoring 
and control, research and experimental development, administration and regulation, training, 
information and communication8 (ISTAT, 2003). 
As underlined above, the consistency of definitions and accounting schemes of SERIEE with the 
European System of Economic Accounts SEC95 ensures comparability of these items with National 
Accounts aggregates. The official statistics provide a detailed picture of the environmental costs 
included in the data of Public Administrations Expenditures by function COFOG classification 
(Classification Of Functions Of Government) developed under the EU Regulation No 2223/96 
founding the National Accounts SEC95 and Manual on Government Deficit and Debt, which 
regulates the processing of transactions related to the general government sector.  
                                                     
8
 Data on environmental expenditure of Italian public administration are  brought to the attention of Parliament in the 
“Report on Environment” periodically prepared by the Ministry of Environment and Protection of the territory. The 
importance of the information derived from environmental accounts, which support environmental sustainability in 
development, is stressed in Environmental Action Strategy for Sustainable Development in Italy approved by CIPE in 
August 2002. 
